17
AVR
AVR
EXRE Weekly Colloquium: Mario Schärli - Kant on Merely Possible Objects
Conférence
Ouvert au grand public
17.04.2024 17:15 - 19:00
En ligne
Abstract:
It is commonly held that Kant's account of existence foreshadows Frege's, Russell's, and Quine's disdain for non-existent objects. This interpretation has consequences for the interpretation of Kant's modal metaphysics because it excludes attributing an ontology of merely possible objects (possibilia) to Kant. Consequently, it has become standard in the literature to deflate Kant's talk of merely possible objects, reducing them to features of the content of judgments. I oppose this line of interpretation and attribute a pivotal role to an ontology of possibilia beyond mere intentional objects to Kant. In this talk, I'll offer a negative and positive argument for my interpretation. The negative argument criticises the claim that Kant's account of existence implies the impossibility of non-existent objects. The positive argument shows that Kantian possibilia exceed our representational capacities in determinacy, which is why they cannot be mere intentional objects.
It is commonly held that Kant's account of existence foreshadows Frege's, Russell's, and Quine's disdain for non-existent objects. This interpretation has consequences for the interpretation of Kant's modal metaphysics because it excludes attributing an ontology of merely possible objects (possibilia) to Kant. Consequently, it has become standard in the literature to deflate Kant's talk of merely possible objects, reducing them to features of the content of judgments. I oppose this line of interpretation and attribute a pivotal role to an ontology of possibilia beyond mere intentional objects to Kant. In this talk, I'll offer a negative and positive argument for my interpretation. The negative argument criticises the claim that Kant's account of existence implies the impossibility of non-existent objects. The positive argument shows that Kantian possibilia exceed our representational capacities in determinacy, which is why they cannot be mere intentional objects.
Quand?
17.04.2024 17:15 - 19:00
En ligne
Organisation
Intervenants
Dr. Mario Schärli, Princeton University
Pièces jointes
CYCLE d'événements:
EXRE Weekly Colloquium
Series of talks organised by the EXRE (Experience and Reason) research group, on topics related to consciousness, experience, rationality and normativity.
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