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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240313T171500
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240313T190000
UID:15303@agenda.unifr.ch
DESCRIPTION:Abstract \nThis paper examines moral intuitionism as formulated by Tropman. In Tropman’s view, moral intuitionism is best construed as the claim that some moral beliefs can be justified without being based on reasons. While this construal of the view has several advantages, it raises an important question: how can a subject be doxastically justified in believing a moral proposition without that belief being based on reasons? I argue that a plausible answer can be provided in light of a specific conception of the bases of intuitively justified beliefs. Such beliefs result from doxastic inclinations and because those inclinations can, depending on the circumstances, explanatorily cohere with the support provided to their object by reasons, beliefs that result from those inclinations can be justified.\n\n
SUMMARY:EXRE Weekly Colloquium: Miloud Belkoniene - Moral Intuitionism: Between Reasons and Inclinations
CATEGORIES:Conférence
LOCATION:MIS 04\, MIS04 4112 (Salle Jaeggi)\, Avenue de l'Europe 20\, 1700 Fribourg
URL;VALUE=URI:https://agenda.unifr.ch/e/fr/15303
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